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The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use 
of Force 
Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin Morris 
INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) occupies a unique position in the regime 
governing the use of force in international politics. Two key principles underpin this 
regime: first, a ban on the individual use of force other than for purposes of self-defence 
(in the face of actual or imminent attack); and second, it is the responsibility of the 
UNSC to determine whether there exists a 'threat to international peace and security' 
(Article 39), a prerequisite to its authorization of the collective use of force to uphold 
'international peace and security' (Article 42). It is upon the UNSC that, '[i]n order to 
ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations', the organization's 191 
members 'confer ... primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security' (Article 24), and in so doing 'agree to accept and carry out [its] decisions 
... in accordance with the present Charter' (Article 25). Crucially, however, action by the 
Council can only be taken with the assent of its five permanent, veto-bearing Members 
(P-5) (Article 27). 
It is now a matter of historical record that during the years of the Cold War the UNSC 
was incapable of performing the collective security role prescribed for it by the Charter. 
During this period of its history Great Power antagonism served to prevent the Security 
Council from meeting its Article 24 obligations and a more limited UN contribution to the 
maintenance of international peace and security was provided only by the advent of its 
non-coercive peacekeeping role (White, 1993). Veto paralysis ensured that the 
organization remained effectively impotent in the face of major security crises, especially 
where these involved the interests of the Cold War protagonists as they invariably did. 
Instead, an uneasy great power peace was maintained by the more traditional 
mechanism of the balance of power, along with the emergence of nuclear weaponry and 
the concomitant logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD). While MAD's calamitous 
implications prevented direct Great Power conflict, the United States and the Soviet 
Union ranked high among the list of those who violated the UN Charter's prohibition of 
the use of force, and yet both invariably sought justifications for their actions in its 
provisions and principles. 
With good cause such rationales were invariably dismissed as rhetoric. It is certainly true 
that both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to exploit to the very limit the 
Charter's vagaries, but neither mounted a direct normative assault on the UNSC's role as 
spelt out in the Charter. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War it was to the articles 
and underlying ethos of the UN — and the legitimacy which these were seen to bestow 
— that Washington turned in its search for international support for its liberation of 
Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1990. Little more than a decade later, however, it was 
the US' forcible overthrow of Saddam Hussein which brought into sharpest focus 
questions regarding the legitimacy of the UNSC. 
COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY  
In the introduction to this collection, Christian Reus-Smit defines an actor or institution 
as experiencing a crisis of legitimacy 'when the level of social recognition that its 
identity, interests, practices, norms, or procedures are rightful declines to the point 
where [the actor or institution] must either adapt ... or face disempowerment' (Reus-
Smit, this volume). In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, as the UNSC became 
more active, questions regarding its legitimacy tended to focus upon its failure 
adequately to represent a UN membership which had almost quadrupled since the 
organization's founding (Fassbender, 1998; Morris, 2000). However, as disagreements 
between the P-5 emerged over the Kosovo crisis in 1998–1999, and even more 
significantly in relation to Iraq in 2003, this debate was overshadowed by one regarding 
the criteria to be applied in determining the acceptable bounds within which states may 
have recourse to the use of force. It is an exploration of these issues, and the 
fundamental bearing that they have on the UNSC's legitimacy, that forms the principal 
focus of this article. 
The argument that follows is presented in the form of two opposing positions. The first of 
these harbours concerns regarding the legitimacy of the UNSC, which it sees as being 
undermined by the Council's apparent inability to constrain great power use of force, 
particularly by the United States. This interpretation of the crisis of legitimacy is 
countered by an alternative understanding — proffered most notably by neoconservative 
forces in the George W. Bush administration — which focuses on the perceived inability 
of the existing UN regime to meet the challenges of contemporary global security (Frum 
and Perle, 2003; Kaplan and Kristol, 2003). Recognizing the United States as having a 
unique hegemonic role within contemporary international society, neoconservatives 
deride the existing collective security regime for impeding the United States as it seeks 
to fulfil the responsibilities that accompany its exalted status. 
Both individually and collectively, all UN member states have the right under Article 51 
of the Charter to use force in response to actual or imminent attack, but this ceases once 
the UNSC 'has taken measures necessary to restore international peace and security', 
and in no circumstances does the right extend to unilateral preventive action. By virtue 
of their permanent, veto-bearing membership of the UNSC, the great powers have a 
privileged role in granting such authorization, but this does not extend to them being 
granted the exceptional right to wage war unilaterally. The destructive potential of 
nuclear conflict during the Cold War necessitated such a constraint, but in a unipolar 
world threatened by the perils of global terrorism, the destructive potential of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD), and the proliferation-bridge of conduit rogue states, 
advocates of this position argue that it is no longer fit for this purpose. It follows, 
according to this line of reasoning, that if international peace and security is to be 
maintained, today's hegemonic power, rather than being constrained as the first among 
equals, uniquely requires freer rein in using force in fulfilment of what the United States 
sees as its rightful role as the guardian of world order. So long as the UNSC serves as a 
brake on the ability of the hegemon to perform such a role, P-5 unanimity, on which its 
successful functioning depends, remains vulnerable to unilateral action. Viewed from this 
perspective, concerns regarding the Council's legitimacy are a mere symptom of a more 
fundamental crisis afflicting the legitimacy of the broader collective security regime of 
which it is part. 
The two competing conceptions of the legitimacy crisis outlined above converge, 
therefore, in the view that the UNSC faces increasing disempowerment, but they diverge 
on the causes of this. For those who wish to preserve and strengthen the existing 
regime, it is the UNSC's inability to constrain the hegemon which is at the root of the 
crisis; for those who believe that the hegemon should be afforded the exceptional 
exemption from the rules governing the use of force, it is this very constraining nature of 
the regime more generally which constitutes the crisis. Which position is taken as to the 
underlying cause of the crisis will have a fundamental bearing on the key question as to 
whether the UNSC remains the exclusive body for deciding when the use of force is 
justifiable and, if not, where the residual authority for making such decisions lies. Those 
who seek to preserve the regime argue that the UNSC's exclusive authority must be 
maintained, even if this means inaction as a result of a failure to satisfy the Charter's 
voting procedures. For proponents of this position, it is procedural conformity that is at 
the heart of legitimacy, but this proceduralism is underpinned by the normative belief 
that observance of the Charter's rules provides the greatest potential for maintaining 
international peace and security. The alternative argument suggests a more flexible 
approach to this exclusivity question and, in its most extreme formulations, tenders a 
notion of legitimacy which privileges the attainment of substantive values over 
proceduralism. It is to these questions that we now turn. 
Top of page  
CONTESTATIONS OVER THE LEGITIMACY OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
REGIME IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
This article, in the spirit of the collection, maintains that in essence legitimacy is 
something which has to be socially bestowed (Claude, 1966; Reus-Smit, 2004; Clark, 
2005). In his introduction to this collection, Reus-Smit distinguishes between the 'social 
constituency of legitimacy' and the 'realm of political action'. This distinction is crucial to 
understanding legitimacy as a social phenomenon rather than as an attribute that actors 
can claim for themselves. As he elaborates, 'the critical thing that differentiates 
legitimacy ... is the necessity of social recognition. No action can be coherently described 
as legitimate if it is not socially recognised as rightful' (Reus-Smit, this volume). The 
'social constituency' is the relevant arena an actor seeks to establish legitimacy in, and 
actors might succeed in legitimating their claims in one constituency while failing in 
others. But as Reus-Smit points out, what is crucial is that those seeking legitimacy 
establish congruency between this constituency and the political realm within which they 
seek to act. Where legitimacy is understood in these terms, it follows that a disjuncture 
between these two spheres is likely to manifest itself in a legitimacy crisis. In practice, 
this issue of congruence manifests itself in questions regarding the centrality of the 
UNSC to decisions pertaining to the use of force. Below, we explore these, focusing on 
Security Council practice since the end of the Cold War, culminating in a more detailed 
consideration of the cases of Kosovo and Iraq. These cases are salient to our argument 
because in both situations force was used in the absence of an explicit UNSC mandate, 
and yet those taking action nevertheless justified it as legitimate. 
For issues relating to the use of force, the political realm will always be global, since the 
normative framework that regulates this aspect of international life will invariably have 
ramifications for future cases. This is the inescapable logic of a global collective security 
regime. However, with regard to conduct in the field of international peace and security, 
it is recognized that the securing of a consensus within a co-extensive social 
constituency is impractical given the size of the UN's membership, the diversity of views 
and interests therein, and the necessity of expeditious action. The procedures of the 
Charter provide, therefore, a surrogate social constituency — that is, the UNSC — in 
order to satisfy the test of congruence that this legitimacy challenge poses. Under the 
Charter it is the 15-state Council that makes decisions in this regard, with resolutions 
requiring nine affirmative votes and the casting of no veto for successful passage (Article 
27). This voting procedure, designed to ensure firstly that the UNSC was not divided 
between the Great Powers, and secondly, that the views of the non-permanent members 
must always figure in deliberations, is a cardinal norm of the UN system (Goodrich and 
Hambro, 1949; Russell, 1958; Claude, 1984). It follows that the composition of the 
Council at any one time is irrelevant to its authority in judging the rightfulness of an 
action, provided that membership of the UNSC is determined in accordance with Article 
23 of the Charter. Less tangibly, though just as unequivocally, Article 24 of the Charter 
requires that, 'in carrying out its duties ... the Security Council acts on [the Members'] 
behalf'. While this responsibility upon the Council does not extend to any procedural 
mechanism by which it can be held accountable to the wider membership and other 
organs of the UN, Council members evidently recognize the need to legitimate their 
individual and collective actions in terms of Charter norms (Henkin, 1979; Franck, 1990; 
Wheeler, 2000; Johnstone, 2003; Morris, 2005. See also Hurd, this volume). 
For those who support the current regime — and believe that the Council remains the 
linchpin of the collective security order — it is conformity with the rules and procedures 
of the Charter that constitutes the most important source of legitimacy. From this 
perspective, there is no crisis for the actual regime, because its procedures provide the 
means by which congruence between social constituency and the realm of political action 
can be maintained. What is instead seen to be in crisis is the means which are placed at 
the disposal of the UN membership, namely the Council. For those who understand the 
legitimacy crisis as rooted in the inadequacies of the regime, what matters is that action 
is taken to maintain global security irrespective of social approval in a constituency 
congruent with the realm of political action. Securing legitimacy remains important, but 
this can be restricted to the actor's core constituency. This does not preclude the raising 
of legitimacy claims within wider international and world society, but the success of 
these is not deemed to be essential, and it may well be ambiguous as to whether these 
are for anything other than instrumental purposes. 
The Bush administration best exemplifies this thinking in its most extreme form. It 
recognizes that the UNSC has a primary responsibility for upholding world order, but 
contests whether the Council is meeting this most onerous of obligations. Dissatisfied 
with the current Charter rules which restrict the right of self-defence to situations in 
which an attack has either occurred or is imminent, Washington seeks an extension of 
the right to cover situations in which the danger is yet to fully materialize. Such a 
change is necessitated, it is claimed, by the emergence of a new security environment 
plagued by the threats which emanate from 'rogue states' developing, and/or terrorist 
groups acquiring, WMD (National Security Strategy, 2002, 2006). 
The radicalism of the proposal that force may be used to counter non-imminent threats 
could be tempered by its embedding in UNSC practice. A willingness on the part of the 
Council to intercede in the face of more distant threats would legally terminate any right 
to take action in self-defence and hence return any such conflict to the confines of the 
UN. To this extent, a more expansive interpretation of Article 39 which encompassed 
preventive war would appear to go a significant way toward placating US concerns. 
Against this one must bear in mind that, although the administration's publicly presented 
rationales for a new interpretation of the self-defence rule suggest that it would be open 
to all states, the wider political context of the debate, so strongly coloured by notions of 
American exceptionalism, generates fears that it would be for the United States alone to 
exercise such a right (Hassner, 2002; Barber, 2003; Jervis, 2006). Key elements within 
the Bush administration see this as both a special prerogative of the United States and 
its responsibility as global hegemon. Such a conviction is underpinned by a belief that 
rightful conduct, as enshrined in the universality of American values, is not dependent 
for its legitimacy on approval in the international social constituency (Kagan, 2004). 
A less radical version of this position suggests that a selective group of states, such as 
those that demonstrably satisfy liberal democratic credentials, may, despite its more 
circumscribed nature, serve as an appropriate social constituency for legitimizing the use 
of force. The suggestion here is that where the UNSC fails to authorize the use of force, 
liberal states have a responsibility to act to uphold global order, including in extreme 
cases through the preventive use of force. A good example of this 'new liberal 
interventionism' is Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter's contention that there is a 
'duty to prevent' non-democratic states from developing WMD on the part of liberal 
states (Feinstein and Slaughter, 2004. For critical appraisals, see Buchanan and 
Keohane, 2004; Wheeler and Morris, 2006). This argument resonates with those liberal 
theorists and leaders who have championed amending the international legal order to 
permit states to use force to protect endangered peoples (Blair, 2004; Tesón, 2005). It 
is to a consideration of these arguments that we now turn. 
LEGITIMACY CLAIMS OVER KOSOVO AND IRAQ 
At the end of the Cold War, the UNSC authorized a number of Western-led military 
interventions aimed primarily at alleviating humanitarian distress. This reflected the 
UNSC's newfound proclivity to interpret Article 39 in a more expansive manner. The 
humanitarian sentiments which, to varying degrees, motivated these actions were, 
however, far from universally shared. Both within and outside of the Council, states were 
suspicious of their underlying motivations, the precedents they set, and the increasing 
ability of Western states to mould the chamber to their will (Wheeler, 2000; 
Chesterman, 2001). Nevertheless, Council endorsement tempered such concerns, 
especially on the part of non-Western governments that had not participated in the 
Council's deliberations. The limits of Council consensus in relation to this new 
humanitarian interventionism were demonstrated by the humanitarian crisis that 
developed in Kosovo. Faced with Russian and Chinese threats to veto, and the 
consequent inability to secure UN authorization, NATO was forced to contemplate 
intervention in its absence. The dilemma presented — to act in accordance with the 
procedures of the Charter and remain inactive, or breach the UN rules in pursuit of 
substantive concerns regarding violations of human rights — was resolved in favour of 
the latter. Although Russia, China and India condemned NATO's action as a breach of the 
Charter regime, the relative equanimity with which NATO's action was greeted by the 
majority of other members of international society bore testament to the extent to which 
the more expansive interpretation of Chapter VII had come to be seen as legitimate 
(Wheeler, 2000). 
There were also assertions that, far from it being NATO that should be held responsible 
for violating Charter norms, it was those who opposed action — and thus forced extra-
UN activity — that should be called to account. The opposition of veto-bearing members 
of the Council prevented the passage of a resolution authorizing intervention, but 
advocates of action maintained that it was NATO that enjoyed majority support both 
within the chamber and among the UN membership as a whole. The best evidence of 
this was the resounding defeat (by 12 votes to three) of a Russian-led resolution 
condemning the intervention. This reflected the fact that in the eyes of many members 
of international society, NATO's action was in conformity with the underlying normative 
purposes of the collective security regime, but that the voting requirements of the 
Charter were preventing the UNSC from living up to its responsibilities (Clark, 2003; 
Wheeler, 2004, 44–47). 
It was for this reason that Kosovo raised questions regarding the 'reasonableness' of the 
threat by permanent members of the Council to exercise their veto power. The relative 
equanimity with which NATO intervention was met suggests that there is considerable 
credence to its claim to have enjoyed significant international support. If this is the case, 
then the unreasonable veto argument seems equally meritorious. It is not, however, 
without its weaknesses. Whatever the extent of their putative support, NATO member 
states never put the matter to the test through a vote in either the Security Council 
(prior to military action) or the General Assembly, and irrespective of how they may 
have fared had they done so, Council members are not expected in the absence of an 
authorizing resolution to act as delegates for the UN membership (though the Council as 
a whole acts on their behalf). What is more, the 'unreasonable veto' argument implies 
that the veto is only ever exercised capriciously, but as Simon Chesterman pointed out, 
Russia's threat to veto might have reflected genuine misgivings about the use of force 
(Chesterman, 2001, 221). Whatever the merits of the argument, what is important 
about the debate in the UNSC is that all the interlocutors relied on legal and moral 
arguments that were anchored in the normative framework supplied by the UN Charter 
(Johnstone, 2003). 
It is the acceptance displayed during the Kosovo crisis that legitimacy claims must be 
articulated within, rather than in disregard of, existing normative frameworks that 
explains the different international response to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Insofar as action in Iraq was intended to rid Saddam Hussein's regime of WMD, 
possession of which was prohibited by previous UNSC resolutions, there is a significant 
similarity with the Kosovo case. Indeed, the principal justification employed by the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Australia (the key military contributors) focused 
on Iraq's non-compliance with existing Security Council resolutions, especially Resolution 
1441 which the Council had unanimously adopted on November 8, 2002, and which 
found Iraq to be in 'material breach' of its obligations under previous resolutions 
(www.un.int/usa/sres-iraq.htm). However, the majority of Council members were 
strongly of the view that this resolution did not provide automatic authority for the use 
of force, and that it would be for the Council (and not individual member states) to 
decide whether Iraq was in breach of the provisions of Resolution 1441 (Blix, 2004, 73–
97, 175–218, 237–249; Malone, 2006, 192–201). This position was rejected by 
Washington, London and Canberra, which argued that the Council's authorization to use 
force against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 continued to provide legality for the 
use of force 13 years later. This line of legal argumentation is not wholly without merit, 
at least insofar as it passes Thomas Franck's 'laughter test' by not exposing its 
proponents to 'shame and ridicule' (Franck, 1990, 55), but it failed to persuade the 
majority of international lawyers and was rejected by a large number of states at the 
UN. In their eyes, the circumvention of the Council's authority over Iraq represented the 
flouting of the key principle of the post-1945 collective security system (Lowe, 2003, 
865–869; Roberts, 2003; Evans, 2004, 67–69; Murphy, 2004; Sands, 2005, 174–203). 
What do the cases of Kosovo and Iraq tell us about the current crisis of legitimacy 
affecting the existing collective security order? In both cases opposition to military action 
was premised, in the first instance, on the grounds that it violated the guiding principle 
of the UN collective security system, namely that force cannot be used (other than in the 
Charter defined situation of self-defence) in the absence of a UNSC mandate. This 
apparently proceduralist position is, as alluded to above, underpinned by a compelling 
normative logic; the preservation of international order. The Charter's voting procedures 
and the special majorities they require are not ends in themselves; rather they exist as 
the best means by which to secure the UN's cardinal norms of the non-use of unilateral 
force, non-intervention, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
member states. These norms provide the cornerstone of international order, most 
importantly among the Great Powers upon whose cooperation the prospects for order so 
crucially depend (Jackson, 2000). 
Those who seek to defend NATO's unilateralism over Kosovo reject the proceduralist 
argument on the grounds it was the UNSC that was failing in its responsibility as 
guardian of international peace and security. Faced with the intransigence of veto-
bearing UNSC members willing to thwart the demands of a majority of the Council, they 
claim that NATO, as a community of the world's leading liberal-democratic states, was a 
sub-optimal, but nevertheless sufficient, social constituency within which consensus 
needed to be secured (Clark, 2003). The validity of this claim rests on the controversial 
contention that NATO represented the moral aspirations and values of world society, and 
that this bestowed upon it the right to act — including through the use of force — in 
defence of these 'civilized' values. More radically, but in a similar vein, the Bush 
administration claims that it was the United States that acted responsibly over Iraq, 
when once again the UNSC was in dereliction of its duties. Unlike Kosovo, Washington 
could not secure a social consensus that stretched further than Congressional authority 
and the support of a few close allies, but nevertheless insisted upon the legitimacy of its 
actions. What underlies this arrogance of power is the belief that America is the 
indispensable guarantor of global order in a post-9/11 world in which the US believes 
itself to be uniquely imperilled. The logic of this position is that the disempowering of the 
UNSC has been brought about, not by the refusal of the hegemon to play by the rules, 
but by the Council's inaction in the face of situations that demand robust responses. 
What is not in doubt is that the UNSC's inability to constrain interventionism in the cases 
of Kosovo, and especially Iraq, constitutes a form of disempowerment. The Council faces 
growing costs in terms of its authority, and risks increasing irrelevance if its already 
limited ability to 'exert ... a pull towards compliance' (Franck, 1990, 16) is further 
diminished. This was certainly the view of Michael Glennon who maintained with regard 
to Iraq that '[w]ith the dramatic rupture of the UN Security Council, it became clear that 
the grand attempt to subject the use of force to the rule of law had failed.' Indeed, he 
went so far as to assert that the UNSC's ability to exert compliance pull is, post-Iraq, so 
limited that in contemplating the use of force states consider only questions of prudence 
rather than legality, asking 'not whether it [is] lawful ... [but] ... simply ... whether it [is] 
wise' (Glennon, 2003, 16). Nevertheless, he overlooks how far those who choose to act 
outside of the Council must also factor into their strategic considerations both the costs 
of undermining an institution of which they are, in most cases, privileged members, and 
the more direct costs which result from their failure to secure a mantle of international 
legitimacy. In the case of Kosovo, both these costs proved to be relatively slight as the 
alliance was able quickly to move back into the multilateral fold. This stands in marked 
contrast to Iraq where the United States and its limited coalition of allies were unable to 
share the political costs or the economic and military burdens of the conflict and its 
aftermath (Malone, 2006, 222–251). What these contrasting experiences show is the 
progressively higher costs associated with increasing levels of incongruence between an 
actor's social constituency of legitimacy and its realm of political action. Given the huge 
material resources at its disposal, Washington is at present able to shoulder such costs, 
but they do nevertheless constitute a form of disempowerment and hence reduce its 
capacity to engage in global policing activities. Moreover, insofar as the status of 
hegemon requires social recognition in addition to material might, it can be argued that 
its ability to fulfil this role is itself in danger of entering its own crisis of legitimacy. The 
implication of the forgoing analysis is that almost all states, from the weakest members 
of international society whose continued existence is inextricably linked with the UN and 
its collective security regime, to the hegemonic United States, have a vested interest in 
resolving the interlinked crises of legitimacy that currently afflict international politics. 
As the UN struggled to cope with the crisis over Iraq, the UN Secretary-General used his 
2003 address to the UN General Assembly to express his considerable disquiet regarding 
the sidelining of the Council. In a veiled reference to the US and its allies, he asserted 
that the doctrine of unilateral, preventive war 'represents a fundamental challenge to the 
principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the 
last fifty-eight years.' Fearful that such a notion 'if it were to be adopted ... could set 
precedents that [would result] ... in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of 
force', Annan nevertheless implored UN members to 'face up squarely to the concerns 
that make some States feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns that drive 
them to take unilateral action.' In his now famous phrase, the Secretary-General warned 
that the UN had arrived at a 'fork in the road' at which its members must decide 
between the status quo and the adoption of radical change. They must not, he 
counselled, 'shy away from questions about the adequacy, and effectiveness, of the rules 
and instruments at [their] disposal ... none [being] more important than the Security 
Council itself' (Annan, 2003). It is to the strategies that might be best employed in 
negotiating the Secretary-General's 'fork in the road' that we now turn. 
RESOLVING THE CRISES OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 
The different understandings of the reasons for the UNSC's disempowerment might 
suggest that it is not possible to identify a remedy that can satisfy the concerns of both 
points of view. This, however, is not the case. The key to resolving the crisis requires 
that proponents of both positions recognize the untapped potential of the Charter, and 
utilize the flexibility which its drafters so wisely built into it over six decades ago. As 
noted above, both have strong incentives for attempting to do so. For those who 
perceive the crisis of legitimacy as lying in the UNSC's failure to constrain the US and its 
allies in their use of force, it is necessary to explore whether the existing collective 
security framework might be adapted to meet the new threats that so animate the Bush 
White House. For those who view the Council as ineffectual in meeting these dangers, 
what is required is greater appreciation of the possibilities of multilateral mechanisms. 
Hence, both sides in this legitimation contest must concede important ground, and the 
key to achieving such an accommodation lies in an expanded understanding of Article 
39. 
In 1945, those responsible for drafting the Charter deliberately rejected the idea that a 
'threat to international peace and security' was amenable to definition, choosing instead 
to vest in the UNSC the ability to judge situations and the threat they posed as they 
arose. The new realities of the security environment of the early 21st century further 
confirm the wisdom of the founding fathers in building flexibility into the potentialities of 
Council action. Faced with the spectre of nuclear proliferation and perhaps even terrorist 
groups armed with WMD, the key issue today is whether the UNSC has the authority to 
take preventive action to deal with threats which are yet to fully materialize (Evans, 
2004, 76–77). The argument that the UNSC should interpret Article 39 to cover non-
imminent threats was pressed most strongly by the Secretary General's High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change. The panel sought to accommodate the two different 
approaches to the legitimacy crisis discussed here by suggesting that, if 'those who are 
concerned about great power unilateralism demonstrate a willingness to fully realise the 
potential of the Charter, those who tend towards unilateralism may be reassured that 
the UN system can provide the necessary security guarantees' (United Nations, 2004). 
This, of course, will only provide a foundation for resolution if those whose proclivities 
are to eschew diplomatic engagement and the views of the majority re-engage with the 
Charter mechanism. So long as they remain wedded to a notion of legitimacy that 
stresses moral absolutism and negates the need for broad social support, there can, in 
the absence of any shift in material power, be no prospect of resolving or ameliorating 
the crisis. Engagement in a genuine dialogue in pursuit of legitimacy that is accepted as 
being dependent on congruence between the social constituency and the political realm 
of action has to be recognized as a sine qua non. It will not suffice for either to engage in 
'bargaining based on fixed preferences' but must involve '"true reasoning", in which 
actors seek a reasoned consensus on the basis of shared understandings, where each 
actor not only tries to persuade but is also prepared to be persuaded' (Johnstone, 2003, 
453). So while the United States would be well counselled to embrace the dialogical 
position noted above, those who castigate it for its unilateralism should heed the words 
of the Secretary-General as to the importance of reassuring Washington that US security 
can be protected through multilateral mechanisms. Establishing a new consensus based 
on the recommendations of the High-Level Panel would result in a realignment of social 
constituency — which would now be re-established as the UNSC — with the realm of 
political action. This broadened conception of threat and newfound commitment to 
address it through collective UN action provides a legitimate mechanism for meeting the 
new security challenges of the 21st century. 
One critical obstacle to this grand bargain is whether the current and future US 
administrations can be reassured by the prospect of collective action under Chapter VII. 
The Bush administration's mindset over Iraq suggests that it, for one, placed little faith 
in this. Believing that the United States is threatened on an unprecedented scale by 
regimes and groups whose ideologies commit them to the destruction of American 
values, Washington considered it axiomatic that the emergency was too great to rely on 
existing multilateral mechanisms of security, especially the UN (Hassner, 2002; 
Hendrickson, 2002; Barber, 2003; Simpson and Wheeler, 2006). Whereas traditionally 
Great Powers were, by definition, the least vulnerable to attack, the most striking 
paradox today is that the most powerful state in the world — and the symbol of the 
prevailing conception of global order — perceives itself to be uniquely vulnerable. From 
this perspective, the vulnerability of the United States can be addressed only through 
policies of regime change, preventive war and national missile defence, and insofar as 
the UN system is incapable of delivering these, it has no choice but to act unilaterally. It 
is this which has led some commentators to argue that the 'depiction of the malady of 
the revolutionary power increasingly fits the United States' (Hendrickson, 2002, 9, 
emphasis added. See also Barber, 2003; Wheeler, 2005; Jervis, 2006). Such a state will, 
as Henry Kissinger famously opined, be beyond reassurance (Kissinger, 1977, 2) and will 
be more sensitive to potential threats and less tolerant of policies which delay remedial 
action. The danger, of which the High-Level Panel was all too conscious, is that those 
who cannot be reassured will be 'impatient' with reliance on Charter rules and 
procedures. This led the Panel to contend that actions of this kind would set precedents 
leading to a generalized erosion of the principles of the collective security regime. They 
warned that, in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order 
and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great 
for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed 
action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all (United Nations, 2004, 55). 
This assessment, however, misses the crucial point that in a post-9/11 world Washington 
perceives itself to be at once uniquely imperilled and yet the only actor capable of 
meeting the challenge. 
It follows from this that for the Bush administration the crisis of legitimacy can only be 
resolved through international society's granting of special rights which entitle the United 
States alone to utilize force in the face of perceived, but as yet nascent, threats. The 
problem, of course, is that what represents the solution from a US perspective 
constitutes the problem for those who remain sceptical about US claims of 
endangerment, concerned by its proclivity to resolve matters through violence, wedded 
to the exclusive rights of the UNSC, and committed to the existing collective security 
regime. In short, for these states the US' prescription fails to address the crisis of 
legitimacy of which they now seek resolution. If this were the end of the story, there 
would be little prospect of reaching an accommodation. However, the unexpected level 
of the costs that Washington incurred as a result of its invasion of Iraq, and the growing 
recognition that its military strength offers little in the way of real leverage in its dealings 
with 'rogue states' such as Iran and North Korea, might lead the administration to invest 
greater significance in seeking multilateral solutions to global problems. 
While these developments bode well for the grand bargain we have outlined, it would be 
naïve to think that, even in a UNSC comprised of states committed to dialogue, cases 
will not present themselves in which different assessments of the threat are 
irreconcilable. This is particularly likely to arise in situations where concerned states are 
calling for preventive action. The fears generated by the Iranian nuclear programme 
represent a case in point, and at the time of writing it remains to be seen whether the 
Council can stay firm to the multilateral route mapped out in Resolution 1696 in a way 
that was not possible over Iraq (www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm). 
If, for example, a proposal for coercive action in response to Iranian non-compliance 
with the resolution were to receive majority support in the UNSC but be blocked by the 
casting of a veto, would legitimacy claims in support of coercion resonate in either 
international or world society? 
Such a situation would reignite the legitimacy contest occasioned by NATO's action in 
Kosovo where the threat of veto precluded adherence to the edicts of the Charter, but 
where there was strong evidence to suggest that there was international support that 
went well beyond the Alliance. The dangers inherent in invoking the 'unreasonable veto' 
cannot be discounted. It is for this reason, along with the optimism that characterized 
the time of its writing, that the Charter gives no credence to it. Nevertheless, the 
essence of the argument that underpins it, namely that procedural determinants cannot 
deprive an action of legitimacy in the face of strong evidence of support within an 
international social constituency congruent with the realm of political activity, remains 
compelling. If the legitimizing grand bargain discussed above can be undermined by the 
vote of a single state — perhaps cast in furtherance of a genuine view of what is best for 
international society, but also possibly on the basis of narrowly conceived selfish 
interests — then it is a highly precarious resolution to the crisis of legitimacy. 
The founders of the UN determined that the ultimate goals of the organization must not 
only be to prevent the resurgence of the major threats to international peace of their day 
— namely Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan — but also to ensure continuing cooperation 
among the Great Powers which were both the organization's architects and linchpins. 
Consequently, they contrived a system in which in the absence of Great Power 
unanimity, institutional inaction resulted. They did so fully cognizant of the fact that in 
such circumstances this would deprive the UN of its ability to fulfil its primary role in 
maintaining international peace and security, and of the fact that while Great Power 
conflict may still ensue, it would be beyond the UN's competence to prevent or 
subsequently deal with this. In the circumstances of their day this was an 
understandable stance, but 60 years hence this is less clearly the case. Great Power 
conflict is no longer commonplace — a result of both the socializing effects of norms and 
the terrifying prospect of nuclear annihilation — and hence the necessity of a complete 
brake on action that cannot be shoehorned into the Charter framework is contestable. 
Where the likely implications for international order fall within acceptable bounds, the 
substantive good to be achieved is worthy and feasible, and sufficient support is 
forthcoming to meet the demands of international legitimacy, strict conformity with the 
voting procedures of the UN Charter can no longer be taken to constitute the defining 
notion of international legitimacy. Whether the first two of these criteria can ever be 
assessed — either in advance or in the aftermath of military action — is a matter of 
intense debate. This is the task that befalls those charged with burdens of state 
leadership, and as such the determinations they make in this regard are likely in turn to 
shape the level of support that is the necessary final element of the calculation. 
CONCLUSION 
The fact that hard cases are likely to present themselves is no reason to eschew the 
crisis resolution model outlined here. We have argued that a bridge has to be built that 
reconciles the alternative conceptions of the crisis of legitimacy facing the UN Charter 
regime and the role of the UNSC at its centre. In his Introduction, Reus-Smit develops a 
theoretical framework which suggests that crises of legitimacy can be ameliorated by 
either recalibrating social relations or by substantiating a fixed preference through the 
exercise of material might. Our examination of Council disempowerment suggests that 
reliance on material levers is at best only a short-term palliative that will lead to 
progressively greater costs being imposed on those who rely on them. As the case of 
Iraq shows, even the United States is susceptible to the consequences of diminishing 
returns. The only long-term solution lies, therefore, in a dialogue that has as its goal the 
re-empowerment of the UNSC as the cornerstone of a revitalized collective security 
regime. On the one hand, the challenge is to persuade those who hold a more 
conservative interpretation of Article 39 to broaden it to enable the UNSC — and hence 
the collective security regime in which they place such store — to adapt to contemporary 
threats and, in extremis, to recognize that there might have to be the occasional 
departures from specific Charter procedures as distinct from underlying norms. On the 
other hand, those who wish to claim special prerogatives in relation to the use of force — 
whether in the form of humanitarian intervention or preventive war — must recognize 
that there is a clear relationship between the legitimacy of such actions and the extent of 
the international social constituency within which they are able to draw support. 
Invariably this support will be maximized where those seeking to act do so in accordance 
with the edicts of the Charter. Where the UNSC is divided and it is believed that 
circumstances exceptionally necessitate the taking of action that circumvents its 
authority, those who seek to act must be sensitive to the fact that their actions 
undermine the ideal of collective security and feed the pessimism of those who harbour 
concerns about the normative capacity of the UNSC to constrain the hegemon. 
The Bush administration has to decide in its second term whether it is prepared to invest 
in multilateral mechanisms of security given its revolutionary predisposition. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War the United States enjoyed a preponderance of power 
no less marked than that of today, and yet it invested more heavily than any other state 
in history in the development of global institutions. It did so because it recognized, 
understood and valued the existence of a framework within which it could engage — 
however unequally — with the growing membership of international society (Ikenberry, 
2001, 2002). In short, the United States understood that whenever and wherever 
possible, it should ensure that its social constituency of legitimacy should be coextensive 
with its orbit of political action. Despite the challenging nature of the Cold War years, 
successive administrations recognized that invariably the policies which most favoured 
US interests were those which were premised on the observance of law, consensual 
decision making, moderation and the preservation of peace (Tucker and Hendrickson, 
2004). Even for an omnipotent state, the legitimacy that flows from such behaviour is 
valuable because it enables a state to tap into the 'wellspring of voluntarism' (Reus-
Smit, this volume) and hence to reduce the costs associated with coercion and bribery. 
And for those who reject such a counsel (Kagan, 2004) one salutary note is worth 
sounding: the one feature common to all of history's Great Powers is their ultimate 
demise. With this in mind, and understanding that in their constraining nature 
institutional frameworks serve to protect the weak from the excesses of the strong, it 
would be prudent for the US to reinvest in global institutions. If a state such as China 
was to rise to take the place of the United States as the global hegemon — a far from 
fanciful prospect given current projections of economic growth — the values which 
Washington and its allies currently champion as being universal may seem far from that. 
In such circumstances many of today's naysayers may be inclined to look more 
positively on an international normative regime embedded in a truly social conception of 
legitimacy. 
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